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ON THE WATERFRONT: CHEESE-EATING, 
HUAC, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Jeffrey M. Shaman* 
The early 1950s were a bleak time for freedom of speech 
and association in the United States. Witch hunts, black lists, and 
loyalty oaths were the order of the day. The Supreme Court, in a 
relatively docile state of mind, went meekly along, acquiescing to 
congressional subpoenas, investigations, compelled testimony, 
and laws making it a crime to belong to the Communist Party. 
Out of these tools of repression an astounding work of art was 
spawned-a movie entitled On the Waterfront. 
Winner of eight Academy Awards, including best motion 
picture of 1954, On the Waterfront is one of the greatest movies 
ever made. In the prestigious, though controversial, survey con-
ducted by the American Film Institute in 1998 to select the 100 
best American movies of the first 100 years of movie-making, 
Waterfront was ranked number eight. Even at that lofty status-
top ten on the all-time list, certainly, is nothing to sneeze at-On 
the Waterfront may have been denied its fair share of acclaim. 
Lingering resentment of its director, Elia Kazan, for his Great 
Betrayal in 1952, may have cost the movie who knows how many 
votes among the Hollywood insiders chosen by AFI to cast bal-
lots. Indeed, just a year before the survey, AFI had refused to 
honor Kazan with a lifetime achievement award, despite his su-
perlative record as a film director. 1 In Hollywood, it seems, old 
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Panic in the Streets (1950); A Streetcar Named Desire (1951), Viva Zapata! (1952), Man 
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grudges die hard. Who is to say, then, that Waterfront didn't lose 
a vote here and there as yet another way of getting back at one 
of Hollywood's most talented but least favorite directors. But 
more of that later. At this point, suffice it to say that On the Wa-
terfront has it all: great acting, great direction, a great story re-
plete with drama, action, romance, and smoldering sex. It is a 
tremendously powerful movie, an example of Hollywood realism 
at its best.2 It even has a message, for those wont for such things 
in a motion picture. I certainly am. Oh, you don't have to remind 
me what the old movie moguls used to say: "If you wanna send a 
message, call Western Union."3 Yes, they were expressing the 
conventional wisdom of the old time Hollywood money men 
that message movies don't sell at the box office. But they were 
wrong-dead wrong. Look at Citizen Kane. Or To Kill A Mock-
ingbird. Or The Graduate. Or, for that matter, look at Waterfront 
itself. Each and everyone of them a message movie that did ex-
tremely well, thank you, at the box office. And besides, a mes-
sage is essential to a true work of art. Messages give us some-
thing to think about, to contemplate, to discuss, to argue about. 
No doubt about it, they make a movie better, much better; they 
make it a work of art. The moguls never understood that. Not-
withstanding MGM's proud but ultimately hypocritical boast of 
Ars Gratia Artis, the moguls always were more interested in 
making money than art. 
As a work of art, On the Waterfront has a vibrant dramatic 
force. It is a modern day morality tale, set on New York's grimy 
docks and environs, pitting good against evil in a tense struggle 
of survival. The film's core message is that those who remain si-
lent in the face of evil are complicit in that evil; the failure to 
take a stand against wrongdoing is itself immoral. This message 
is expressed through the conflict raging within the film's pro-
tagonist Terry Malloy, played by the incomparable Marlon 
Brando in an incredible performance which quite deservedly 
won an Academy Award. Brando's performance alone, full of 
founder of and teacher at the Actors Studio, whose original members included Marlon 
Branda, Montgomery Clift, Julie Harris, Anne Jackson, Karl Malden, Eli Wallach, and 
Shelly Winters. Before becoming a director, he acted in both movies and stage plays. 
2. "On the Waterfront came as a public shock in 1954 because Hollywood films 
have stayed away from the real America .... " PAULINE KAEL, I LOST IT AT THE 
MOVIES 54 (1965). 
3. One collection of quotations claims that this adage could be the single most re-
peated cliche in the history of movie making and that it has been variously attributed to 
moguls Samuel Goldwyn, Harry Warner, and Harry Cohn, as well as to several actors 
and writers. See RALPH KEYES, "NICE GUYS FINISH SEVENTH"-FALSE PHRASES, 
SPURIOUS SAYINGS, AND FAMILIAR MISQUOTATIONS 130 (1992). 
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anguish and pain, yet so tender, is well worth the price of admis-
sion. Kazan himself was awed by Branda's performance. Re-
membering one scene between Brando and Eva Marie Saint, 
Kazan said, "the depth of guilt as well as tenderness on Branda's 
face is overwhelming. "4 And the famous scene of Brando and 
Rod Steiger (who also gave a wonderful performance), as they 
confront their demons in the back seat of a taxicab, truly is one 
of the memorable moments of movie history. Kazan again sums 
it up well: 
What other actor, when his brother draws a pistol to force him to 
do something shameful, would put his hand on the gun and push it 
away with the gentleness of a caress? Who else could read "Oh 
Charlie!" in a tone of reproach that is so loving and so melancholy 
and suggests that terrific depth of pain?5 
Full of pain and anguish, Waterfront also reflects the sensi-
bilities of its time, the 1950's. Like the plays of Arthur Miller, 
Waterfront was meant to prove that great drama didn't have to 
be about kings and queens or the upper classes. The common 
people, it seems, can be just as interesting as royalty. As Miller 
showed, even traveling salesmen could suffer from the same sort 
of tragic flaws that beset Shakespearean kings and queens, and 
this made for great theater.6 Turning that lesson on its head, Wa-
terfront demonstrated that the common man or woman could 
possess a nobility of spirit thought to be reserved for kings and 
queens, and that, too, made for exciting drama. Even "a figure 
out of the American lower depths,"7 a washed-up ex-pug like 
Terry Malloy, could achieve heroic status through an act of 
moral and physical bravery. 
Some of the other notions of the day reflected in Waterfront 
are not so sublime. In the 1950's when the movie was made, a 
renegade parish priest like the one in this film played by Karl 
Malden showed his mettle and his solidarity with the dock work-
ers by smoking cigarettes and taking a drink now and then. By 
today's standards, that seems a bit quaint, not to mention politi-
cally incorrect. And by today's standards, the language of the 
film occasionally becomes offensive, as when one of the dock 
workers explains that "One thing you gotta understand, Father, 
on the dock we've always been D and D ... deaf and dumb. No 
4. ELlA KAZAN, ELlA KAZAN: A LIFE 526 (1988). 
5. /d. at 525. 
6. See ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN (1949). 
7. KAEL, supra note 2, at 48. 
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matter how much we hate the torpedoes, we don't rat." The al-
literative phrase "deaf and dumb," though perhaps unobjection-
able in the fifties, certainly has a jarring, demeaning ring today.8 
Still, there is no denying the dramatic power of Waterfront, 
played out in the raw clash between good and evil. In Water-
front, evil is represented by the ironically named Johnny 
Friendly9 (played by Lee J. Cobb), the crude, vicious, brutal, ci-
gar-chewing, corrupt mob boss of the docks who feeds like a vul-
ture on the meager salaries of poor working people and orders 
the murder of anyone who challenges his iron reign over the 
docks. Despite his criminal behavior, Friendly is able to evade 
the law because no one, not even the good working people he 
abuses, will testify against him. On the docks, there is nothing 
worse than being a "stoolie," or a "rat." Nobody wants to have 
anything to do with a crummy "cheese eater," so the workers 
steer clear of the Waterfront Crime Commission which is inves-
tigating corruption on the docks. 
Father Barry, the parish priest with a streak of community 
activist to him, wants to take on the mob. He tries to convince 
the dock workers that cheese-eating ain't so bad, in fact, may be 
the honorable thing to do. He puts it this way: 
How can we call ourselves Christians and protect these murderers 
with our silence? ... Anybody who sits around and lets it happen, 
keeps silent about something he knows has happened, shares the 
guilt of it just as much as the Roman soldier who pierced the flesh 
of our Lord .... 
Eventually, Father Barry is able to convince Terry Malloy 
that testifying against Johnny Friendly to the Waterfront Crime 
Commission is the right thing to do. For Terry, testifying is an 
act of redemption that absolves him of his sins. Though he is vili-
fied for being a rat by his fellow dock workers, by the neighbor-
hood kids who previously idolized him, and even by the cops, 
Terry remains defiant. He shows up at the dock, demanding his 
right to work, and proclaiming that he is happy he testified. "I'm 
glad what I done-you hear me?-glad what I done!" he 
screams at Johnny Friendly while all the dock workers gape in 
8. As late as 1%9, Peter Townshend used the phrase in his lyrics for "Pin Ball 
Wizard" in the rock opera Tommy: 
That deaf dumb and blind kid 
Sure plays a mean pin ball! 
9. Near the end of the movie, it is revealed that the name Johnny Friendly is a 
pseudonym. The character's real name, it turns out, is Michael J. Skelly. 
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silence at the spectacle of good rising up against evil. And finally 
good does triumph over evil, but not until Friendly's goons vi-
ciously beat Terry while the workers stand by and watch. But 
then the workers have a change of heart, and rally around Terry. 
They won't work unless he does, they say. Battered and bloody, 
Terry pulls himself up and walks-by himself-into the hold of a 
ship, ready for work. 
In the context of the movie, there is no denying that it is an 
act of heroism when Terry Malloy finally decides to testify 
against Johnny Friendly to the Waterfront Crime Commission. 
After all, Friendly not only was a crooked union boss cheating 
good working people out of a living wage, he also was a vicious 
murderer. Johnny Friendly had ordered the murder of at least 
three people, including Terry's brother, Charlie the Gent. To 
make matters worse, it was at Johnny Friendly's behest that 
Terry was tricked into luring his pal Joey Doyle up to the tene-
ment roof, where, unbeknownst to Terry, Friendly's goons were 
waiting to throw Joey to his death. If that weren't enough, Terry 
has fallen in love with Joey's sister, who has returned to the 
neighborhood after being away at parochial school, only to find 
her brother dead at the hands of the local mobsters. Racked with 
guilt over his unwitting participation in Joey's death, is it any 
wonder that Terry would finally see the rightness of ratting on 
Johnny Friendly? 
But the morality of cheese-eating gets a bit more compli-
cated when considered beyond the context of the film itself, es-
pecially when considered in light of the personal history of the 
film's director, Elia Kazan. Oh, you don't have to remind me 
what the New Critics used to say, a work of art is coherent on its 
own and should be allowed to stand on its own. To the New Crit-
ics, the artist's background and the circumstances surrounding 
the creation of a work of art are of no moment. By now, though, 
the New Critics are decidedly Old Hat. And wrong. Yep, as 
wrong as the movie moguls were about sending messages. While 
it is true that a work of art can stand on it own, if it has to, it also 
can be enhanced immeasurably by considering the artist's back-
ground and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
work. A work can be made infinitely more interesting by exam-
ining matters external to the work itself. There is no question, 
for example, that The Great Gatsby is a wonderful novel that 
stands beautifully on its own; yet it is even more fascinating 
when considered in light of the parallels between the lives of the 
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novel's protagonist, Jay Gatsby, and its author, F. Scott Fitzger-
ald. 
Similarly, there is a fascinating subtext to On the Waterfront. 
To understand that subtext, one has to go back to the 1940's, a 
few years after World War II, when McCarthyism was beginning 
to run rampant throughout the land and the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities was investigating the perils of Com-
munism with no less than a missionary zeal.10 The House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities-also known simply as the 
Committee11 or, most infamously, by the disparaging acronym, 
HUAC. Oddly enough, the letters of the acronym HUAC are 
sequentially incorrect, but no less able for it to evoke fear and 
loathing in many a heart. 
HUAC came to Hollywood in 1947.12 At the time, the 
chairman of the Committee was J. Parnell Thomas, a Congress-
man from Illinois.13 According to Walter Goodman, the author 
of a comprehensive study of HUAC,14 Thomas was a right-wing 
extremist whose animus would find fertile soil with the Commit-
tee.15 He was mean-spirited and had little brook for the constitu-
tional rights of witnesses called before the Committee.16 As far 
as Thomas was concerned, witnesses who claimed a constitu-
tional right to refuse to answer questions were all part of "a con-
certed effort on the part of the Communists, their fellow travel-
ers, their dupes, and paid apologists to create a lot of fog about 
constitutional rights, the First Amendment, and so forth." 17 
In Hollywood, the HUAC hearings got off to an ominous 
start when the first witnesses to be subpoenaed, the so-called 
"Hollywood Ten," were charged with contempt of Congress for 
refusing to give a yes or no answer to the question: Are you now 
10. In 1938 the House of Representatives established the House Special Committee 
on Un-American Activities to investigate "subversive and un-American propaganda." 
H.R. Res. 282, 75th Cong. (1938). In 1945, it was made a standing committee of the 
House-the House Committee on Un-American Activities. H.R. Res. 5, 79th Cong. 
(1945). In 1969 the Committee's name was changed to the House Committee on Internal 
Security. H.R. Res. 89, 91st Cong. (1969). 
11. In fact, a definitive work on the Committee by Walter Goodman is titled THE 
COMMITIEE (1968). 
12. VICfOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES viii (1980). 
13. GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 24. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. at 24. 
16. See WILLIAM K. KLINGAMAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MCCARTHY ERA 185-
86 (1996). 
17. /d. at 186. 
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or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?18 In 
all probability the Ten could have refused to answer that ques-
tion by invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, although it would be a few years until the Su-
preme Court got around to ruling for the first time that an indi-
vidual's membership in the Communist Party was, in fact, within 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment.19 For whatever reasons, 
the Hollywood Ten decided to base their refusals to answer the 
question not on the Fifth Amendment, but on the First Amend-
ment, which protected freedom of speech and association.20 The 
Ten claimed that HUAC had no right to probe into their politi-
cal beliefs and associations, which were protected by the First 
Amendment. The Committee, though, was unmoved by any con-
stitutional claims, and at the Committee's behest Congress voted 
to cite the Ten for contempt. The hearings in Hollywood were 
suspended while the Ten appealed their convictions. Meanwhile, 
to support the Ten, a group of big-name movie stars founded the 
Committee for the First Amendment, but it didn't last very long, 
"fold(ing) almost as fast as it formed."21 In 1951, after all appeals 
had been exhausted to no avail and the Ten were imprisoned for 
terms of up to one year (not to mention being blacklisted from 
future employment), the hearings in Hollywood began once 
again, and this time with an even greater vengeance.Z2 The 
Committee knew that they had the Congress and the Courts be-
hind them, and witnesses knew full well that if they failed to co-
operate the consequences could be dire: the blacklist and im-
prisonment. 
Supposedly, the purpose of the Committee was to investi-
gate and weed out Communism in the movie industry. In actual-
ity, however, the Committee seemed much less interested in ob-
taining information about Communist "infiltration" of the 
motion picture industry than it was in demeaning the individuals 
who were called upon to testify. Perhaps the most egregious ex-
ample of this occurred when the actor Larry Parks was brought 
18. /d. 
19. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950). 
20. NA VASKY, supra note 12, at 82-83, 399-400. There is a powerful symbolic value 
in relying upon the First Amendment rather than the Fifth. Claiming protection under 
the First Amendment conveys a positive message that the activity in question was a legal 
form of expression or association that may not be criminalized, whereas "pleading the 
Fifth" conveys a negative message that a criminal act may have been committed but its 
perpetrator may not be compelled to testify about it. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415,428-31 (1963). 
21. NA VASKY, supra note 12, at 83. 
22 !d. at viii-x, 82-84. 
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before the Committee. While Parks freely admitted that he had 
once been a member of the Communist Party and was fully will-
ing to describe party activities, he asked the Committee not to 
force him to name other names.23 Indeed, he begged the Com-
mittee not to make him "crawl though the mud to be an in-
former. "24 His plea, though, was unavailing; the Committee com-
pelled him to name names, despite the fact that it knew full well 
that Parks had nothing new to tell that the Committee didn't al-
ready know. This sort of degrading ritual was conducted repeat-
edly throughout the HUAC hearings.25 The Committee subpoe-
naed one witness after another and forced each of them to name 
names that the Committee knew were already on its list. 
Elia Kazan was called to testify before the Committee in 
1952.26 At first he answered all of the Committee's questions ex-
cept those about other persons.27 But a few months later when 
he was called back to testify a second time, he gave the Commit-
tee the names of eight colleagues from the Group Theater with 
whom he had been in a Communist "cell" seventeen years be-
fore.28 Kazan was hardly the only witness to cooperate with 
HUAC, and it is unfair to focus solely on him. Moreover, the 
real villains of this story are the congressional members of 
HUAC and the studio bosses who possessed the power to chal-
lenge the Committee, but were too frightened or greedy or nar-
row-minded (or, most likely, all three) to do anything but toe the 
line. On the other hand, the individuals who were forced into 
becoming informants were themselves victims, made to degrade 
themselves in a public ceremony designed to break their will. 
Kazan, though, insists that he did not regret his testimony, 
and he set out in On the Waterfront to make that clear. He began 
work on the film about a year after testifying before HUAC. As 
many people suspected when Waterfront was released29 and as 
Kazan admitted in his 1988 autobiography,30 the movie was, at 
least in part, an attempt to justify his naming names before the 
Committee. Looking back on it all, Kazan wrote: 
When Brando, at the end, yells at Lee Cobb, the mob boss, "I'm 
23. !d. at viii. 
24. !d. at ix. 
25. !d. at 314-29. 
26. !d. at 202. 
27. !d. 
28. !d. 
29. David Denby, On che Oucside Looking In, PREMIERE, Aug. 1988, at 28. 
30. KAZAN, supra note 4, at 500. 
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glad what I done-you hear me?-glad what I done!" that was me 
saying, with identical heat, that I was glad I'd testified as I had ... 
So when critics say that I put my story and my feelings on the 
screen, to justify my informing, they are right. That transference of 
emotion from my own experience to the screen is the merit of 
those scenes. 31 
139 
But ratting on a cruel killer like Johnny Friendly is one 
thing; ratting on your friends and colleagues for being fellow 
travelers years ago is quite another. For all the revisionist at-
tempts to rewrite history to show that Communism posed a real 
threat to American society, there certainly was no real threat 
from the poor souls whom Kazan named to the Committee or, 
for that matter, from any other Hollywood fellow travelers 
named by other witnesses who cooperated with the Committee. 
There simply is no parallel between informing on an unques-
tionably evil monster like Johnny Friendly and informing on 
former colleagues who at worst were misguided in their political 
views. Informing on a Johnny Friendly clearly is the right thing 
to do, but in less absolute circumstances, the morality of inform-
ing is decidedly more ambivalent. In some situations, informing 
may be an act of dishonor. No doubt Lillian Hellman had it ex-
actly right when, in explaining her refusal to name names to the 
Committee, she said: 
I am not willing, now or in the future, to bring bad trouble to peo-
ple who, in my past association with them, were completely inno-
cent of any talk or any action that was disloyal or subversive ... 
(T)o hurt innocent people whom I knew many years ago in order to 
save myself is, to me, inhuman and indecent and dishonorable. I 
cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year's fash-
ions .... 32 
To those who still insist that naming names was justifiable 
because of the threat posed by Communism, there is always the 
pointed question of why, if they really believed that there was a 
true danger from Communism, they didn't name names before 
HUAC began to put pressure on them to inform.33 That question 
has led at least one victim of the blacklist, the writer-director 
Abe Polonsky, to assert that the witnesses who cooperated with 
HUAC did so to save their careers, and not for any high-minded 
31. /d. 
32. LILLIAN HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME 93 (1976). 
33. NAVASKY, supra note 12, at 279. 
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ethical or political considerations.34 Whereas Terry Malloy 
risked his life and his job when he testified before the Water-
front Crime Commission, the witnesses who cooperated with 
HUAC were saving their skins. While Terry's act was one of 
moral conscience, testifying before HUAC was an act of moral 
cowardice?5 
Yet some of the witnesses friendly to HUAC claimed that 
they named names out a sense of conscience. One of those 
friendly witnesses was Budd Schulberg, who wrote the screen-
play for Waterfront. A few days after he was named to the 
Committee as a former member of the Communist Party, Schul-
berg sent a telegram to HUAC stating, "I will cooperate with 
you in any way I can. "36 When he appeared before the Commit-
tee, Schulberg described how he was made to suffer the heavy 
hand of thought control when other party members tried to 
make him rewrite a novel-in-progress to conform to the party 
line, and called him on the carpet when he refused to do so.37 In 
his testimony, Schulberg named fifteen former party members.38 
Not long after that he began work on the Waterfront screenplay. 
In later years, Schulberg tried to justify his testimony by arguing 
that the Communist Party was totalitarian and repressive.39 "I 
testified," he defiantly declared, "because I felt guilty for having 
contributed unwittingly to intellectual and artistic as well as ra-
cial oppression. "40 This hardly explains, however, why Schul berg 
named names. After all, testifying about the Communist party is 
one thing; informing on individuals quite another. 
Moreover, cooperating with HUAC was getting into bed 
with the devil. HUAC, with its inquisitional methods, was hell-
bent on a witch hunt that degraded individuals and ruined their 
lives for no other reason than that they dared to question the 
pieties of American life. HUAC, of course, had no appreciation 
of freedom of speech, freedom of thought, or freedom of asso-
ciation. It had no understanding of the First Amendment, of the 
value of dissent, or of the right of individuals to think for them-
selves. HUAC abused its power, subverted the Constitution, and 
trampled on civil liberties. The very existence of HUAC was an 
34. Id. at 279-80. 
35. See PETER ROFFMAN & JIM PURDY, THE HOLLYWOOD SOCIAL PROBLEM 
FILM 293-94 (1981). 
36. NAYASKY, supra note 12, at 239. 
37. /d. at 239-40. The novel was WHAT MAKES SAMMY RUN? 
38. /d. at 241. 
39. /d. at 242. 
40. Id. 
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affront to the dignity of the individual and to freedom of 
thought. If anything was un-American, it was HUAC itself. 
HUAC was an abomination, and to cooperate with it by naming 
names was detestable. 
Still, Kazan's suggestion that he was able to transfer the 
emotion of his experience of informing to the screen in Water-
front raises the interesting possibility that reprehensible behav-
ior can be cleansed to some degree by using it as a source to en-
hance art. And so, the critic David Denby is willing to forgive 
Kazan, partially, because the director was able to turn his sin 
into great art: 
I will never agree with Kazan's political behavior, but if his act of 
self-liberation (blabbing to the committee) allowed him to take his 
lifelong emotions, objectify them, and turn them into scenes as re-
verberant as any in American movies, then perhaps he did the right 
thing. Not right as a man, but right as an artist.41 
Many artists, as well as other persons in Hollywood and 
elsewhere, were not strong enough to withstand the threat of be-
ing blacklisted. It is not difficult to understand why. Careers 
were ruined, friendships and even families were split apart, all by 
the blacklist. The blacklist was the very antithesis of freedom of 
speech. Operating through suspicion and innuendo, it punished 
people for holding unpopular beliefs, for criticizing the govern-
ment, for aspiring to a better life. It embodied guilt by associa-
tion; nothing more than membership in the Communist Party 
was enough to taint an individual, perhaps for life. 
As McCarthyism swept across the country creating a climate 
of fear and repression, the Supreme Court did little to protect 
freedom of speech or association. Talk about complicity! Where 
were the Justices of the Supreme Court, with their life tenure 
and judicial independence, when we needed them to put some 
brakes on this anti-Communist tyranny by the majority? In fact, 
the Court itself seemed swept along with the tide of anti-
Communist hysteria, content to turn its back on First Amend-
ment freedoms, when they were most in need of support. In 
1949, the Court declined to review the convictions of the Holly-
wood Ten, paving the way for their imprisonment.42 Two years 
later, the Court announced its decision in Dennis v. United 
States,43 upholding the convictions of eleven persons for violating 
41. Denby, supra note 29, at 28. 
42. NAVASKY, supra note 12, at 84. 
43. 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
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the Smith Act, a federal statute that made it a crime to advocate, 
abet, advise, or teach the desirability or propriety of overthrow-
ing the government by force or violence. The defendants in 
Dennis, convicted of conspiring to organize the Communist 
Party, were sentenced to long terms in prison. The Court's deci-
sion in Dennis represents the low point for freedom of speech 
and association in the United States. It allows mere membership 
in the Communist Party, or simply the expression of an opinion 
in support of Communism, to be made a crime. The defendants 
in Dennis, after all, had done little more than teach about Marx-
ist-Leninist doctrine,44 yet in the eyes of six learned Justices of 
the august Supreme Court of the United States, neither the con-
victions nor the Smith Act itself violated the First Amendment. 
The plurality opinion in Dennis,45 written by Chief Justice 
Vinson, is a bold example of legal sophistry. It acknowledges the 
value of freedom of speech and purports to follow the philoso-
phy of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, proponents of a strong 
First Amendment, who advocated that speech may only be re-
stricted when there is a "clear and present danger" that it will 
cause a substantive public evil.46 But the opinion then quickly 
turns aside the thoughts of Holmes and Brandeis. "[N]either Jus-
tice Holmes nor Justice Brandeis," the opinion declaims, "ever 
envisioned that a shorthand phrase (clear and present danger) 
should be crystallized into a rigid rule to be applied inflexibly 
without regard to the circumstances of each case."47 After all, 
"[s]peech is not an absolute," beyond control of the legislature 
when it believes that "certain kinds of speech are so undesirable 
as to warrant criminal sanction."48 
The plurality opinion then puts the finishing touches on the 
Holmes-Brandeis philosophy by replacing the clear and present 
danger test with a test announced by Judge Learned Hand in the 
opinion below.49 "In each case," Hand said, "[courts] must ask 
44. So far as the present record is concerned, what petitioners did was to organize 
people to teach and themselves teach the Marxist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in 
four books: Foundations of Leninism by Stalin (1924); The Communist Manifesto by 
Marx and Engels (1848); State and Revolution by Lenin (1917); History of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (B.) (1939). 
/d. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
45. Justice Clark did not participate in the case. Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton 
joined the opinion of Chief Justice Vinton. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in 
the judgement and Justices Black and Douglas dissented. 
46. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507-08. 
47. /d. at 508. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. at 508-10. 
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whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, 
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger. "50 This approach provides considerably less protection 
for freedom of speech than the clear and present danger test. 
Under Hand's test, if the potential danger or evil that may be 
caused by speech is sufficiently grave, it need be neither clear 
nor present. Thus, in Dennis itself, where the feared evil (violent 
overthrow of the government) was admittedly grave, the lack of 
evidence showing its probability or imminence did not deter the 
Supreme Court from upholding the convictions in the case. 
There was a sad irony to the Court's adoption of Judge 
Hand's test in Dennis, because decades before, in a previous era 
of repression, Hand had been an early champion of free speech. 
In 1917, as a federal district court judge, he ruled that The 
Masses, a radical journal of the day that assailed the United 
States' entry into World War I, could not be excluded from the 
mails.51 Hand's decision was an act of considerable courage at a 
time when the Red Scare was about to sweep through the land. 
Hand maintained that some words were "keys of persuasion," 
while other words were "triggers of action. "52 The former were a 
legitimate part of the public discourse; the latter were not. Ac-
cordingly, Hand drew a line between speech that was mere 'ger-
suasion" and speech that amounted to direct "incitement." In 
correspondence with Justice Holmes, Judge Hand tried to con-
vince Holmes to be more appreciative of the value of free speech 
and to adoEt the Hand formula distinguishing persuasion from 
incitement. 4 While Hand's exhortations no doubt played a role 
in convincing Holmes of the value of free speech, Holmes never 
accepted the incitement standard, preferring instead to use the 
clear and present danger test as a means of providing protection 
for freedom of speech.55 Indeed, Holmes dismissed the Hand 
formulation with the riposte that "Every idea is an incitement."56 
Conversely, Hand did not think well of the clear and pre-
sent danger test. In his view, it was too slippery to provide ade-
50. /d. at 510 (referring to United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 
1950)). 
51. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d 
Cir. 1917). 
52. /d. at 540. 
53. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAI'D- THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 157-58 
(1994). 
54. /d. at 161-67. 
55. !d. 
56. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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quate protection for free speech.57 Even Supreme Court justices, 
he observed, were not immune from the "herd instinct" of seeing 
a clear and present danger lurking around the corner when one 
did not really exist58 - an observation that would prove all too 
prescient. Hand preferred a more objective standard, a hard and 
fast rule that was not so manipulable. To his way of thinking, 
speech should be protected by the First Amendment unless it di-
rectly advocated or incited illegal activity. 
Hand's formulation, however, was not without its own 
flaws. Like other hard and fast rules, it did not provide a very 
good scale for assessing competing values or interests. In many 
instances, Hand's standard did not draw the line at the right 
place and therefore was prone to protecting both too much and 
too little speech. It gave no constitutional shelter to trivial 
speech that directly advocated illegal action but posed no real 
threat of fruition. Antithetically, it provided constitutional shel-
ter for consequential speech that did not directly advocate illegal 
action but posed a real threat of causing it. Hand's formula, then, 
was far from ideal. 
In any event, by the time of his Dennis opinion in 1950, 
Hand had given up on his direct incitement formulation, believ-
ing it to be a failure that had found little favor. 59 As a lower fed-
eral court judge, Hand "took seriously his obligation to follow 
Supreme Court precedents."60 This, however, hardly explains his 
opinion in Dennis opting for an approach debilitating the clear 
and present danger test and providing diminished protection for 
freedom of speech.61 Hand himself, it seemed, had succumbed to 
the "herd instinct" and took along with him a plurality of the 
Supreme Court. 
In addition to the plurality, two other Justices-Frankfurter 
and Jackson-concurred in the judgment to uphold the defen-
dants' convictions. Both of these Justices rejected use of the 
clear and present danger test. Justice Jackson rejected the test 
because he believed that in a case such as Dennis it required the 
Court to appraise "imponderables" that would baffle the best-
informed minds.62 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter thought that the 
57. Gunther, supra note 53, at 163-70. 
58. Id. at 169. 
59. /d. at 600. 
60. ld. 
61. For a valiant, though ultimately unconvincing, effort to explain Hand's opinion 
in Dennis, see id. at 599-605. 
62 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 570 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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test required courts to read "events still in the womb of time" 
and make determinations beyond their competence.63 To Frank-
furter's way of thinking, primary responsibility for adjusting the 
competing interests presented by the case belonged to Con-
gress.64 The Supreme Court, he asserted, should exercise "self-
restraint" and defer to the judgment of Con§ress, setting it aside 
only if there was no reasonable basis for it.6 Frankfurter's posi-
tion, Justice Black noted in a dissenting opinion, "waters down 
the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an 
admonition to Congress. "66 
There were two dissenters on the high Court in Dennis-
Justices Black and Douglas. As Black saw it, the plurality had 
repudiated the clear and present danger in a way that greatly de-
flated the protection afforded by the First Amendment.67 The 
defendants, he noted, were not charged with overt acts of any 
kind designed to overthrow the government; the charge was 
nothing more than that they agreed to assemble to discuss their 
plans at a later date.68 The indictment, then, amounted to "a 
virulent form of prior censorship" forbidden by the First 
Amendment.69 
Justice Douglas stressed that the Communist Party posed 
little threat to the nation and there simply was no clear and pre-
sent danger to justify the convictions in the case.70 A clear and 
present danger must be based on something more than fear or 
speculation; rather, there must be some immediate harm that is 
likely to occur if the speech is allowed.71 In Douglas' view, that 
standard clearly was not met. The protestations of Justices 
Douglas and Black, however, were unavailing to their colleagues 
on the Supreme Court. 
In Dennis, a majority of the Court was unwilling to rein in 
misuse of congressional authority. This carried over to a pro-
nounced reluctance to curb the investigative authority of 
HUAC, even when the Committee seemed to be abusing its 
power. Traditionally, the Court has granted great deference to 
congressional committee investigations, allowing a committee 
63. !d. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
64. !d. 525. 
65. !d. at 525-26. 
66. !d. at 580 (Black, 1., dissenting). 
67. !d. 
68. !d. at 579. 
69. !d. 
70. !d. at 588-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
71. !d. at 585. 
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pretty much carte blanche to probe wherever it chooses, so long 
as it stays within the scope of congressional authorization.72 In 
Barenblatt v. United States, the Court upheld the authority of 
HUAC to question a college professor about his membership in 
the Communist Party, and confirmed his conviction of contempt 
for refusing to answer the Committee's questions.73 Ruling that a 
congressional delegation of authority to one of its committees to 
conduct an investigation should be construed broadly, the Court 
concluded that HUAC's probe did not violate the First Amend-
ment. 
Even when Justices were manifestly disconcerted by the tac-
tics of HU AC, they were not willing to step into the fray to re-
strain the Committee. Thus, in one case Justice Jackson admit-
ted that: 
I should not want to be understood as approving the use that the 
Committee on Un-American Activities has frequently made of its 
power. But I think it would be an unwarranted act of judicial usur-
pation to strip Congress of its investigative power, or to assume for 
the courts the function of supervising congressional committees. I 
should affirm the (contempt conviction) below and leave the re-
sponsibility for the behavior of its committees squarely on the 
shoulders ofCongress.74 
During this period of time, as a result of the New Deal 
Court crisis, the Supreme Court had adopted a stance of defer-
ence toward Congress, allowing it extremely wide latitude to ex-
ercise its legislative authority.75 This may have been an appropri-
ate strategy for dealing with legislation that concerned economic 
matters. But it proved to be disastrous for dealing with legisla-
tion that impinged upon civil liberties. The Court's timidity dur-
ing the time of McCarthyism allowed Congress to run roughshod 
over freedom of speech and association. 
As the Warren Court began to take shape, there were some 
dissenters from the Court's disregard for First Amendment 
rights. In Barenblatt, for example, Justice Black wrote a dissent-
ing opinion accusing the majority of: 
(Ignoring) the interest of the people as a whole in being able to join 
72. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 302-04 (2d ed. 2002). 
73. 360 u.s. 109 (1959). 
74. Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 196 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
75. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION-ILLUSION 
AND REALITY 76-79 (2001). 
2003] ON THE WATERFRONT 
organizations, advocate causes and make political "mistakes" 
without later being subjected to governmental penalties for having 
dared to think for themselves. It is this ri~ht, the right to err politi-
cally, which keeps us strong as a Nation. 7 
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Justice Black's eloquent statement squarely captures the 
heart of the First Amendment: the right to think for oneself. As 
Justice Black says, this is a source of strength, not weakness, for 
our nation. Years later, the Court would come to recognize that 
toleration of criticism, even to the extent of tolerating the burn-
ing of an American flag, is "a sign and source of our strength."77 
When McCarthyism began to wane, the Court belatedly re-
wrote the book on freedom of speech and association, ruling in a 
series of cases that membership in a supposedly subversive or-
ganization may not be made a crime unless the government can 
show that an individual actively joined the organization knowing 
of its illegal objectives and with the specific intent of furthering 
those objectives.78 In the Court's reconstructed view, the right of 
association finally was recognized as a "cherished freedom"79 
specifically protected by the First Amendment,80 and guilt by as-
sociation was denounced as a doctrine "which has no place 
here. "81 The Court also became less deferential in reviewing leg-
islative authority to conduct investigations and began to place 
First Amendment limits on legislative inquiries.82 In 1958, the 
Court ruled that the government may not compel disclosure of 
an individual's membership in an organization unless the gov-
ernment can demonstrate a genuinely compelling need for the 
disclosure.83 "Inviolability of privacy in group associations [the 
Court stated] may in many circumstances be indispensable to the 
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a 
group espouses dissident beliefs."84 Finally, in 1967, the Court 
struck down a federal statute that was the equivalent of the 
blacklist in that it denied employment to persons who were 
76. Barenblart, 360 U.S. at 144 (Black, 1., dissenting). 
77. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,419 (1989). 
78. See Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 
203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
79. Ellbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11,17 (1966). 
80. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263, n.7 (1967). 
81. Eljbrandt, 384 U.S. at 19. 
82. See Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); DeGregory v. New 
Hampshire Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966). 
83. NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
84. !d. at 462. 
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members of Communist organizations.85 Since then the Court 
has adhered to an expansive view of the First Amendment, 
granting wide protection to freedom of expression and associa-
tion. 
In 1969, in the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,86 the Supreme 
Court came full circle and then some by returning to the 
Holmes-Brandeis philosophy of freedom of speech and combin-
ing the clear and present danger test with the direct incitement 
formulation of Learned Hand. In Brandenburg the Court 
squarely ruled that speech may not restricted unless it "is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action. "87 By requiring both in-
citement and imminent lawless action that is likely to occur, the 
Brandenburg test "com bin[ es] the best of Hand's views with the 
best of Holmes' and Brandeis'."88 This, however, did not satisfy 
Justices Black and Douglas, the two dissenters in Dennis. Some-
time after Dennis they gave up on the clear and present danger 
test, believing (as Learned Hand did years before) that it was too 
slippery to provide adequate protection for free speech. By the 
time Brandenburg was decided both Black and Douglas had 
moved to a more absolutist view of the First Amendment and 
had come to the conclusion that the clear and present danger 
"should have no place in the interpretation of the First Amend-
ment."89 A majority of the Court, though, was content with the 
newly reinforced clear and present danger test, and has adhered 
to it pretty well ever since. 
So how did justice turn out in all of this? Well, Johnny 
Friendly, I suppose, got his just deserts, at least dramatically. At 
the end of the movie, his hold over the waterfront broken, the 
men no longer fearful of him, Friendly is unceremoniously 
dumped into the polluted waters of the harbor by none other 
than Pop Doyle (Joey's father). And more in the way of retribu-
tion may be in store for Friendly. Given Terry Malloy's testi-
mony to the Waterfront Commission about Friendly's criminal 
activities, the mobster's next place of residence may well be 
prison. Perhaps, then, the law will be fulfilled. Not completely, 
though, as Johnny Friendly, unfortunately, may be just the tip of 
85. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258. 
86. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
87. !d. at 447. 
88. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 848 (2d ed. 1988). 
89. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 454 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
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a criminal iceberg. In the film, there are hints that Friendly has 
connections in the police force and to someone referred to as 
"Mr. Upstairs." During the waterfront hearings, there is a shot 
of an unidentified man watching the hearings on television and 
telling his secretary that he will no longer see Johnny Friendly. 
So, while Johnny Friendly got his comeuppance, others-the big 
bosses and the police-may not get theirs. 
Terry Malloy attained justice by redeeming himself through 
an act of bravery and virtue, which enabled him to triumph over 
evil, not only the evil of Johnny Friendly, but also the evil within 
himself. Through his heroic act, he finally won the right to work, 
the respect of the dock workers and-most importantly-his 
own self-respect. 
As for justice for the real-life participants to the drama that 
surrounded On the Waterfront, the record is decidedly mixed. 
Some of the individuals who were blacklisted eventually were 
able to reclaim their careers, but many were not. Careers and, 
indeed, lives, were ruined by the blacklist. While there was no 
justice for the Hollywood Ten who went to prison for their po-
litical beliefs, they could perhaps enjoy a kind of vicarious poetic 
justice when J. Parnell Thomas, the mean-spirited chairman of 
HUAC, was convicted of taking kickbacks from his staff and was 
imprisoned in a federal correctional institution, where his fellow 
inmates included two of the Hollywood Ten.90 Politics and cor-
ruption, it seems, make for strange cellmates. 
In 1999, after being denied recognition for his work for 
years, Elia Kazan was finally honored with an Academy Award 
for his lifetime achievement. The award for Kazan, which was a 
long time in coming, was proposed by Karl Malden, who by then 
was a respected elder statesman of the Hollywood community 
and a former president of the Motion Picture Academy of Arts 
and Sciences. The 39-member board of the Academy voted 
unanimously, althou~h in some cases grudgingly, for the honor-
ary Oscar to Kazan. 1 Outside the auditorium where the Acad-
emy Awards were being given, a small group of individuals pick-
eted in protest of the decision to give Kazan an award. Inside the 
auditorium, when the Oscar was finally presented to Kazan, 
most members of the audience rose from their chairs to give him 
a standing ovation. A few, however, refused to stand or to ap-
plaud. Certainly, if one considers only Kazan's body of work, he 
90. NAVASKY, supra note 12, at 84. 
91. See Patricia Bosworth, Kazan's Choice, VANITY FAIR, Sept., 1999, at 326. 
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richly deserved the Oscar. In that respect, justice, although long 
delayed, was accomplished. On the basis of his work, Kazan 
clearly deserved the Oscar; on the basis of his HUAC testimony, 
though, perhaps he did not deserve a standing ovation. Still, af-
ter the passing of so many years some measure of forgiveness 
was in order. 
I think, though, that despite his protestations to the con-
trary, Kazan regretted his testimony for the rest of his life, and 
that he spent a good portion of the rest of his life trying unsuc-
cessfully to convince himself that he did the right thing. While 
Terry Malloy was able to redeem himself in his own mind, Elia 
Kazan, perhaps, never was able to do that. 
In real life, some degree of justice also came to the water-
front itself. The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 
established in 1953, was able to rid the docks of the daily "shape-
up," depicted so vividly in the movie, which gave hiring bosses 
like Johnny Friendly the sole power to decide who would work, 
often in return for kickbacks or favors (like pushing somebody 
off a roof).92 In addition, hydraulic lifts have replaced the hook, 
cable, and nets with which stevedores like Terry Malloy formerly 
toiled.93 
As for HUAC, the House of Representatives finally saw fit 
to abolish its ignominious Committee in 1975. That, too, was an 
act of justice long delayed. 
92. Douglas Century, Still A Contender on the Waterfront, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 
1999, at E37. 
93. /d. 
